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TRANSFERABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY ACTIONS:
A PROCEDURAL ANOMALY
S ECTION 2a( i) OF THE Bankruptcy Act authorizes each federal district
court to adjudge bankrupt those persons, among others, who have their
principal place of business, residence, or domicile within the court's
territorial jurisdiction.' Although this section has been regarded in some
quarters as imposing a jurisdictional prerequisite,' the extensive amend-
ment, in 1952, of the transfer provisions of the Act,3 lends support to
2 30 STAT. 545 (189g), as amended, ii U.S.C. § I (i95z). More specifically,
this section provides that courts of bankruptcy may "[a]djudge persons bankrupt who
have their principal place of business, resided or had their domicile within their re-
spective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or for a longer portion of
the preceding six months than in any other jurisdiction, or who do not have their prin-
cipal place of business, reside, or have their domicile within the United States, but hwve
property within their jurisdictions, or who have been adjudged bankrupts by courts of
competent jurisdiction without the United States, and have property within their juris-
dictions, or in any cases transferred to them pursuant to this Act." See note 3 infra.
2In re Federman, x19 F.zd 754 (2d Cir. ig4) 5 Higgins v. State Loan Co., I14
F.zd z5 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; In re Ettinger, 76 F.zd 741 (2d Cir. 1935) 3 1 REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY § 40 (5th ed. 195o)..
Prior to 1952, the effect of non-compliance with section za(i) was not altogether
clear. On the one hand, a number of decisions seemed to regard compliance as necessary
to give the court power over the subject matter. of the action,.and, absent some element
of estoppel or laches, non-compliance could be raised as a basis for setting aside the
adjudication at any time. In re Federman, supra; In re Ettinger, supra; Finn v. Caro-
lina Portland Cement Co., 232 Fed. 815 (5th Cir. 1916); In re Enjay Holding Co.,
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 446 '(S.D.N.Y. 1937) 5 In re Garneau, 127 Fed. 677 ( 7 th Cir.
1904). Other decisions seemed to assunie that section za(i) compliance was necessary
only to give personal jurisdiction over the debtor and indicated that where the objector
had taken part in the proceedings, he could not later contest the adjudication on grounds
of non-compliance with section za(i). Fairbanks Shovel Co. v. Wills, 24o U.S. 642
(x916) 5 In re Mason, 99 Fed. 256 (W.D.N.C. igoo). Still other decisions explicitly
referred to the requirements of that section as venue requirements. In re Evans, 85 F.2d
9 Z (2d Cir. 1936); In re Consolidated Burner Service Corp., 32 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y.
1940). With regard to dismissal, of course, it made no difference in most cases whether
section 2a(i) was regarded as a jurisdiction or a venue statute since a court could only
transfer a case when actions had been filed in two different courts, each one satisfying
a section 2a(i) requirement.
a 66 STAT. 424, 11 U.S.C. § 55 (i9s5). The pre-1952 transfer provisions, now
contained in section 32(a), provide that "[i]n the event petitions are filed by or against
the same person . . . in different courts of bankruptcy each of which has jurisdiction, the
cases shall, by order of the court first acquiring jurisdiction, be transferred to and
consolidated in the court which can proceed with the same for the greatest convenience
of the parties in interest." These provisions were amended, in 1952, by the addition
of subsections (b) and (c). Subsection (b) provides for the transfer of any action, in
which venue is improperly laid "to any other court of bankruptcy in which the action
could have been brought." Subsection (c) authorizes the transfer of any case to any
other court of bankruptcy "regardless of the location of the principal assets of the
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the contention that section 2a(i) is rather a venue provision.4 A recent
district court decision5 has highlighted this divergency of attitude and
has underlined the urgent need for definitive treatment of the true
nature of this section as well as the proper application of the new transfer
provisions, section 32(b) and (c).
In In re Martinez,' petitioners, proceeding under chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act,7 failed to allege any of the section 2a(i) require-
ments, whereupon the referee dismissed the proceedings for want of
jurisdiction.8 Rejecting the petitioners' contention that the provisions
of section 2a(i), in light of the 1952 amendments to section 32, now
relate merely to venue and, accordingly, may be waived, the district
court, on appeal, affirmed.'
bankrupt, or his principal place of business, or his residence, if the interests of the
parties will be best served by such transfer." See 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 32 (14th
ed. 1940, Supp. 1956); , REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 51.5 (Supp. 1957).
As indicated by H.R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., ad Sess. 7 (1952), these amend-
ments were modeled after provisions similarly available in non-bankruptcy proceedings.
"[Section 3 2(b)] incorporates the substance of the general statute on venue of district
courts stated in [28 U.S.C. § 2406], modified only to accommodate it to the Bankruptcy
Act. . . . [Section 32(C)] makes available to the bankruptcy judge a power to transfer
a case . . . similar to that now accorded the judge in a non-bankruptcy proceeding by
[28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)]. This power could already be exercised by a judge in a Chapter
X proceeding, because of the authority granted by section I 1S. A cause is also added
to section 2a(x) of the act . . . to authorize the court to exercise jurisdiction in a case
so transferred to it." See note i supra. See also, Comment, The Scope, Effect and
Review of Orders Under r404(4), 8 STAN. L. REV. 388 (1956); Note, IS N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 399, 404-05 (940).
'It should be observed that a few cases have already indicated that section 2a(s) no
longer relates to jurisdiction. For example, in Saper v. Long, 131 F. Supp. 795, 796-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) the court concluded: "The very passage of section 32 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act permitting a court to transfer cases to other districts was a recognition by
Congress that [section 2a(.)] . . . related solely to venue." See also, In re Flexton
Corp., 2o8 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1953); In re Fada Radio & Elec. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 89
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); In re Marine Aircraft Corp., x8 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. '954).
Cf. In re Consolidated Burner Service Corp., 32 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); In re
Evans, 85 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1936). But cf. In re Pilgrim Plumbing Supply Corp., 123
F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
'In re Martinez, 140 F. Supp. 221 (D. Kan. 1956).
Ibid.
52 STAT. 930 (1938), It U.S.C. § xoo (x952).
8Actually, there were two proceedings involving wage earners plans under Chapter
XIII. Since neither petition indicated that venue had been properly laid, the referee
issued an order requesting that an order be obtained from the court fixing venue. Upon
failure of such an order to issue, the referee dismissed the proceedings.
* Arguably, the court's holding virtually nullified the effectiveness of section 32(b)
since this section is applicable only where venue has been laid in the wrong court. How-
ever, since none of the parties to the proceedings entered an objction to the improper
venue, it is conceivable that the availability of transfir turns upon whether or. not an
objection to venue has been raised; and, that, absent such objection, dismissal rather than
transfer must be ordered. To this effect, the court said: "But this is not to say that the
The conclusion that a bankruptcy proceeding must be dismissed if
none of the alternative requirements of section 2a(i) have been satisfied
is at least somewhat questionable. For, the underlying premise that
section 2a(.i) is jurisdictional in nature is quite incompatible with
the text of section 32(b), which provides:
Where'enue in any case filed under this title is laid in the wrong
court of bankruptcy, the judge may, in the interests of justice,
upon timely and sufficient objection to venue being made, transfer
the case to any other court of bankruptcy in which it could have
been brought. (Emphasis added.) 10
Initially, therefore, it would appear that section 3 2(b) implicitly
regards the provisions of section 2a(i) as going to venue rather than
jurisdiction; otherwise there could be no wrong venue which the former
section could be invoked to cure." Furthermore, the permissive lan-
guage in which the authority to transfer is couched, as well as the pre-
requisite that "objection to venue" be made before such a transfer can
be effected, implies a breadth of discretion in the court's disposition of
objection based on non-compliance with section 2a(i) that is inconsistent
with the finding that its provisions are jurisdiction. If satisfaction of
one of the alternatve requirements of section 2a(i) were necessary to
empower the court to entertain a bankruptcy matter, its absence pre-
sumably would compel dismissal.'
Perhaps the most persuasive indication that section 2a(i) was con-
gressionally received as relating merely to venue is found in the legisla-
tive history of section 3 2(b). Significantly, in reporting out the bill con-
taining this latter section the House Report declared: "Ordinarily, no
doubt, the venue rules in bankruptcy will serve the interests of justice,
but in the event that in the special case they do not, the judge will have
'transfer' statute, as amended, is meaningless and will not be given full effect.... Under
sub. b, 'upon timely and sufficient objection to venue being made,' cases will be trans-
ferred . . . when the judge is convinced that such action will be 'in the interest of
justice.' " (emphasis added). 14o F. Supp. at zzs.
10 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 55 0952).
" "By enabling the Court to transfer to another district Congress impliedly recog-
nized [section 2a(i)] to be simply a venue statute .... [T]his is dearly the intent of
Congress reading [section 2a(z)] together with [section 3 2(b)]." Saper v. Long, 131
F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See note 4 supra.
" The Martinez decision apparently stands for this proposition despite language to
the contrary in its opinion. For the court stated that "in the view it now enter-
tains, [it will not] assume jurisdiction generally over bankrupts. . . not within its
District and not within any of the categories set out in Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act."
14o F. Supp. at 225. See note z supra.
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the discretion to retain.the proceeding" 3 (emphasis added.) Thus, the
legislative history of section 3Z(b) as well as the more reasonable con-
struction of its text impels the conclusion-that section 2a(i) is a venue,
not a jurisdictional, provision.
Assuming, then, that the provisions of section 2a(i) refer to venue,
it is further dear that categorical dismissal of an otherwise meritorious
petition for want of proper venue substantially frustrates congressional
design. For, section 3 2(b) and (c) contemplates the theoretical avail-
ability to a court of three alternative modes of disposition of an im-
properly filed petition: retention and transfer, as well as dismissal. And
in light of the broad powers that this section now makes available, the
dismissal of such a petition would seem no longer to be a tenable course.
For, the preservation of an early filing date of a petition in bankruptcy
is of prinie importance both for the purpose of utilizing alleged acts of
bankruptcy as the bases for an involuntary adjudication,' 4 and for the
purpose of dating the avoidance powers of the trustee in the event of an
adjudication'"- and this can be effected only through the court's exercise
of its powers to retain or transfer the matter."'
If, then, a bankruptcy court is constrained either to retain or to trans-
fer a meritorious petition, it is important to consider the factors that
should determine this choice. Where no objection is made to venue in a
court that does not meet the criteria of section 2a(i), it would seem that
the court should proceed with the case-as it would do in a non-bank-
13 H. R. Rep. No. 232o, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952). See notes 3, 4 .utra.
1430 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended,' ix U.S.C. § 2x(b) (1952).
Is 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 1i U.S.C. § 96a(i), b (1925) (Prefer-
ential transfers), 30 STAT. 564 (.898), as amended, xi U.S.C. § 107(a) (159z) (liens
resulting from judicial proceedings); 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, it-U.S.C.
§ 107(d) (1952) (fraudulent conveyances).
"3 Factors which, in non-bankruptcy cases, have been similarly significant in decisions
against dismissal for want of proper venue are: the possibility that the running of the
statute of limitations- may bar the action in the forum finally deemed appropriate; the
expense and delay involved in the commencement of a new action; and, the difficulty
in re-obtaining jurisdiction. Orr v. United States, 174 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1949). See
also, Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thompson, 218 F.ad 514 (4 th Cir. 1955); Unter-
singer v. United States, 1S1 F.ad 953 (2d Cir. 1950 ) ; Norris v. Yates, io9 F. Supp. 436,
437 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 95 F. Supp. 469, 471 (S.D.
Iowa 1951). Cf. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955), 55 COLUM. L. REV.
xo67 (955), 54 MICH. L. REV. 285 (1955), 41 CORNELL L. 0. 311 (i955); All State
Freight v. Modarelli, x96 F.2d 1oio, iox (3 rd Cir. 1952); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v.
Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360, 362 (4th Cir. '1949). See generally, Keffee,
Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REv. 569
(1952); Notes, 69 HARv. L. REv. 119 (1955), 6o HARv. L. REV. 424, 434 (1947).
See text to note 13 supra.
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ruptcy matter." Moreover, universal absence of objection would seem
t6 justify the conclusion that this is, indeed, a proper court-one in which
the retention of the matter is desirable.
Upon timely objection to venue, however, the court should guage its
sufficiency and ascertain the court in which the proceedings can most
conveniently and economically be heard.'" If it concludes that the case
should be transferred, this procedure is dearly authorized by section
32(b) if the court to which the transfer is proposed satisfies the-criteria
of section 2a(i). However, the direction that transfer may run to a
court in which the case "could have been brought" would seem to pre-
dude transfer to another court which does not meet the criteria of sec-
tion 2a(i), although it may obviously be the most convenient forum.'9
" Commenting upon the failure of a -party to object to improper venue, Mr. Justice
Van Devanter, speaking for the Court in Commercial Gas Ins. Co. v. Consolidated
Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 179 (i929), opined: "[Venue] merely accords to the defendent
a personal privilege respecting the ... place of suit, which he may assert, or may waive
at his election."
" As a general rule, the most convenient forum should be determined by weighing
considerations such as, "(i) proximity of creditors of every kind to the court; (2) prox-
imity of the bankrupt to the court; (3) proximity to the court of the witnesses neces-
sary to the administration of the estate; (4) location of the assets; and, (5) the eco-
nomic and efficient administration of the estate." In re Triton Chemical Corp., .46
F. Supp. 326, 329 (D. Del. 1942). See also, Haas v. Gerstel, 134
. 
F.2d 8o3, 8o4-,o5 (sth
Cir. 1943); In re American Bond.& Mortgage Co., 58 F.2d 379 (D. C. Maine 193z),
aff'd, 65 F.2d 455 (ist Cir" 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 68o (1933) ; In re Devonian
Mineral Spring Co., 272 Fed. 527, 532-33 (N.D. Ohio 92o) ; In re United Button
Co., 137 Fed. 668, 672-73 (D. Del. 1904) ; In re Statewide Theatres Corp., 4 F. Supp.
86 (D. Del. 1933). Moreover, that considerations of convenience and economy only
should be decisive of the question ds to which court should finally adjudicate the case
seems clearly to be indicated by the language of section 32(c). For, in determining to
which court transfer should run, the propriety of venue is to be disregarded, the order
of transfer issuing to that court in which "the interests of the parties will best be
served." See note 3 supra. For a discussion of the criteria which determine the.most
convenient forum in non-bankruptcy cases, see Kaufman, Observations on Transfer
Under Section z4o 4 (a) of the New Judicial Code, io F.R.D. 595, 605 (x951).
"9 The conclusion that, under section 32(b), transfer may issue only to a court which
satisfies the venue requirements of section 2a(i) seems to have its fundamental basis
in the interpretation which non-bankruptcy courts, in the administration of transfer
provisions similarly applicable, have given to the phrase "[could] have been brought."
In this respect, it has generally been held that the court to which transfer is to be made
be proper both as to venue and as to jurisdiction. Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel, 185 F.zd
777, 780 (gth Cir. 1950) ; Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, xSi F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 195o).
But see, Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Iowa 195o). Apparently, the primary
consideration in these decisions is the fear that the transfer provisions could in effect
amount to a device for extra-territorial service of process. Accordingly, "[could] have
been brought" has been construed to mean the practical probability, rather than the
theoretical possibility, that the party resisting transfer would have been subject to serv-
ice of process in the proposed transferee district. Masterpiece Productions v. United
Artists, 90 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Pa. ig5o).
It might be argued, however, that this restrictive interpretation given to the transfer
DUKE BAR JOURNAL
Thus, to localize a case in its most convenient forum in this situation, a
subsequent transfer would be indicated under section 32(c), which em-
powers a court to transfer any case "regardless" of the propriety of
venue "if the interests of the parties will be best served by such trans-
fer."20  Such circuity; obviously not contemplated by the amendments,
may be easily averted, however, by permitting the court in which the
petition was originally filed, albeit not satisfying the criteria of section
2a(i), to retain the matter or to transfer it to other courts not sanctioned
by section 2a(I) under the broader provisions of section 32(c), as the
interests of the parties. would seem to dictate.
In final analysis, it seems clear that dismissal of a petition, whether
on.jurisdictional grounds, as in the Martinez case, or, for want of proper
venue, contravenes the spirit of section 32(b) and (c). Moreover, it
gives rise to the anomalous possible situation that a convenient forum,
owing to non-compliance with section 2a(i), will be forced to transfer a
case to a less convenient forum under section 32(b) only to have it trans-
ferred back under section 32(c). It seems clear that the transfer pro-
visions of section 32 were not intended to create such an anomaly. They
were rather enacted to bring flexibility into the proceedings by permitting
a court, in the exercise of its discretion, to transfer the case regardless of
venue requirements; or, to retain the proceedings if the interests of
justice and the convenience of the parties would thereby be best served.
provisions by non-bankruptcy courts should not be decisive in bankruptcy actions. First,
the Federal Constitution would not prohibit the invocation of extra-territorial service of
process in bankruptcy proceedings. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438, 442 (1946). And, although such nationwide service of process has been held only
to apply to reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, Continental Bank V.
Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 683-84 (1935), the Supreme Court has intimated that,
in this respect, there is no practical distinction between straight bankruptcy proceedings
and reorganization. Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 6so, 6x5 (1934). Secondly, it is con-
ceivable that those hardships which may attend the use of extri-territorial service of
process would not be present in the administration of sections 3 2(b) and (c) since the
choice of transferee forums is limited to those in which a case could be adjudicated in
the "interest of justice" or in the "interests of the parties." In re Fada Radio & Elec.
Corp., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 89, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Cf. In re American Fuel & Power
Co., 32 F. Supp. E07 (D. Del. 1940).
'0 See note 3 supra.
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